Appeal – CW Tremayne

hearingid: 733f9c5c6049f554a9df21e0e7dfca36

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hearing_racingtype: thoroughbred-racing

startdate: 01/01/2001

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hearing_title: Appeal - CW Tremayne

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The Appellant has appealed against the decision of the Judicial Committee at a race day hearing on the 28^th September 2005 at Te Aroha, when Jockey Tremayne was suspended from the conclusion of racing on Saturday the 1^st October 2005 until conclusion of racing on Saturday the 29^th October 2005.

IN THE MATTER of the Rules of Racing

BETWEEN CATHERINE WENDY

TREMAYNE

Appellant

AND JUDICIAL CONTROL

AUTHORITY

Respondent

Mr M McKechnie for the Appellant

Mr A Coles for JCA

Date of Hearing 13^th October 2005

The Appellant has appealed against the decision of the Judicial Committee at a race day hearing on the 28^th September 2005 at Te Aroha, when Jockey Tremayne was suspended from the conclusion of racing on Saturday the 1^st October 2005 until conclusion of racing on Saturday the 29^th October 2005.

The grounds for appeal were stated as, "The period of suspension is excessive."

Counsel for the Appellant, Mr M McKechnie, in his written submissions argued that having regard to the severity of the charge the suspension was excessive, and that when compared with penalties imposed in more serious charges the suspension is clearly seen to be excessive.

Mr McKechnie referred to similar charges in which suspensions of between 2 to 15 days were imposed, considerably less than the four weeks in this instance.

In concluding Counsel stated that if the JCA is to raise the level of disqualification (sic) for breaches of this rule then this should only be done after due warning.

Mr Coles in his submissions on behalf of the Respondent argued that as the ground relied upon by the Appellant was that the period of suspension was "excessive" whilst Rule 1207(2) of the Rules of Racing empower the Appeals Tribunal to act only if the suspension was "manifestly excessive" the appeal must fail.

He also argued that the offence, while not falling within the definition of "serious racing offence", is nevertheless a serious breach of the Rules of Racing. He also traversed the principles under which an appeal authority may interfere with the decision of a lower Court or Tribunal.

Having heard the parties and viewed the film of the race this Appeal Tribunal delivered the following oral decision:

REASONS RELIED UPON FOR THE ABOVE DECISION

This Appeal Tribunal is conscious of the fact that the consequences flowing from a period of suspension are dependant upon a variety of considerations each impacting upon the person suspended in different ways depending upon the circumstances of each case.

A suspension for a two-week period will not have as much punitive effect on a jockey with limited rides as that on a more senior rider constantly in demand.

Similarly, the punitive affect is greater when a suspension is imposed during a major carnival whereby a suspension for two days at that time is likely to equate to a five to six day suspension on the country circuit.

Further, it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice to impose a standard penalty for a specific offence. For instance, on a charge of failing to ride a mount out, Rule 866(1)(b), it is necessary to take into account whether the mount could have finished in a stake winning or dividend paying position rather than down the field and, to a lesser extent, the status of the race concerned. Clearly if a jockey stopped riding short of the winning post and as a result lost 8^th place, finishing 9^th, the penalty should not be commensurate with that of a jockey losing a dividend paying or stake winning place.

This is not in any way detracting from the principle that it is the duty of all involved in racing to preserve the integrity of the industry. There must be punishment for any offence. However, if natural justice is to be preserved then each case must be dealt with on its merits. The imposition of the same penalty for all breaches of a particular offence, regardless of the circumstances, will result in a proliferation of appeals as demonstrated by Mr McKechnie at part 5 of his submissions, where he compared this current period of suspension against those imposed in various other more serious offences.

In this present appeal we have given full consideration to the statements of the judicial committee in imposing penalty.

We accept that we as an appeal Tribunal cannot merely exercise our discretion over that of the judicial committee unless we are satisfied that the judicial committee had not given sufficient weight to any relevant considerations or given too much weight to irrelevant matters.

In this regard, we accept the submissions of Counsel for the Appellant, that the judicial committee "was influenced by extraneous matters:

We accept that these are matters that may or even should be considered by the judicial committee, but are not such that they would have a material impact on the quantum of penalty.

Further, the film of the race showed that Miss Tremayne's mount was never going to finish better than third. However, because of a moment's inattention, the film showed that she stopped riding two paces short of the winning post, she dead heated for third and the dividend and stake were reduced accordingly.

It is our respectful belief that the judicial committee should have placed more weight upon the status of the race, the fact that she retained her third place, and more importantly, the past record of Miss Tremayne.

In delivering our oral decision on the 13^th October, we referred, for comparison purposes, to the decision of a judicial committee at Ellerslie on the 8^th October 2005, dealing with a similar charge against jockey NG Harris where he was suspended for a period of three and a half weeks, despite the fact that this was a stakes race and Mr Harris's mount lost third place. He had also been guilty of the same offence on previous occasions.

In referring to that decision we were doing a disservice to the judicial committee whose decision is being appealed before us, in that the Harris decision was some 11 days after the suspension was imposed on Miss Tremayne.

Nevertheless, as Mr McKechnie in his written submissions demonstrated as mentioned above there were other instances of suspensions imposed in respect to this offence that were of assistance to this Appeal Tribunal in reaching its decision, that should have been readily available to the committee.

For the above reasons, we were satisfied that this is a matter in which we should exercise our discretion and for that reason quashed the suspension and imposed a lesser term of suspension expiring after racing on the 22^nd October 2005.

These reasons relied upon in bringing down the decision delivered orally on the 13^th October 2005 have been reduced to writing this 15^th day of October 2005.

Norman F Smith                                                                   Richard M Seabrook

Chairman

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hearing_type: Old Hearing

Rules: 1207.2, 1207.1.c, 866.1.b

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