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Appeal C Grylls v RIU – Decision dated 10 January 2015

ID: JCA10808

Hearing Type:
Non-race day

Decision:

BEFORE AN APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF THE

JUDICIAL CONTROL AUTHORITY

UNDER THE RACING ACT 2003

IN THE MATTER of the New Zealand Thoroughbred Rules of Racing

BETWEEN CRAIG GRYLLS, Licenced Jockey

APPELLANT

AND THE RACING INTEGRITY UNIT (RIU)

RESPONDENT

Appeals Tribunal: Mr Murray McKechnie, Chairman & Mr Richard Seabrook

Present: Mr Craig Grylls, Licensed Jockey

Mr Ginger Tankard, Advocate for Mr Grylls

Mr John Oatham, Senior Stipendiary Steward

Mr Matthew Williamson, Registrar

DECISION OF APPEALS TRIBUNAL

ELLERSLIE RACECOURSE

DATED THIS 10th DAY OF JANUARY 2015

1. NATURE OF APPEAL

1.1 This is an appeal from a decision of the Raceday Judicial Committee at Ellerslie on New Year’s Day following Race 5, the New Zealand Bloodstock Royal Stakes, a Group 2 race for three-year-old fillies.

1.2 The senior jockey Mr Craig Grylls pleaded guilty to a charge under Rule 638(1)(d) of careless riding. It was said that he allowed his mount, SAAVOYA, to shift out at the 300 metre mark when not clear of the horse DE KENSINGTON OVAL ridden by Mr Riddell, which clipped a heel and fell. The horse EZRA ridden by Ms Satherley, was unable to avoid the fallen runner DE KENSINGTON OVAL and also fell, and this in turn hampered the chances of the horse DARCI’S DREAM ridden by Mr Cameron.

1.3 After hearing submissions from Mr Grylls and Mr Neal on behalf of the RIU, the Raceday Judicial Committee imposed a suspension to commence after racing on the 3rd of January this year and to conclude on the 31st of January this year, being a period of 18 days. In addition the Committee imposed a fine of $1,000.

1.4 Mr Grylls is represented today by Mr Tankard who is a vastly experienced advocate and it is well known to the tribunal that Mr Tankard has extensive experience in race reading.

2. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

2.1 The legal principles in outline are that an appeal hearing of this kind is by way of rehearing. That means that the Appeals Tribunal must reach its own decision upon its view of the evidence. Nonetheless it must have regard to the decision of the Raceday Judicial Committee and the reasoning set out in that decision. The Tribunal has carefully considered the raceday decision and has read the transcript of the hearing. The principal submission for Mr Grylls is that the period of suspension was too long and there was also reference to the consequences of the fine.

2.2 We shall now outline in summary the cases presented for Mr Grylls, and for the RIU which is represented by Mr Oatham.

3. THE CASE FOR MR GRYLLS

3.1 Mr Tankard contended that the essential facts were not in dispute. That is not accepted by Mr Oatham. It was Mr Tankard’s position that the horse SAAVOYA moved inwards for some two strides when not sufficiently clear of DE KENSINGTON OVAL. For his part, Mr Oatham contends that it was something like five strides.

3.2 The Tribunal was struck by the fact that the head-on view in the film demonstrates that there was clear space to Mr Grylls’ left, to his outside, but nonetheless the horse SAAVOYA was angled towards the rail. It is accepted and not essentially disputed that the inward movement was not abrupt but it was significant and involved moving in some two horse widths.

3.3 Mr Tankard pointed to the fact that the penalty guidelines do not provide any assistance in cases where a fall has occurred. Mr Oatham responded to that and we shall make reference to that later in this decision.

3.4 Mr Tankard then pointed to Mr Grylls’ very good riding record. In the last 12 months he has had something like 820 rides without facing a careless riding charge.

3.5 It was then explained to the Tribunal that Mr Grylls had very significant rides available to him in the upcoming period covered by the period of suspension. Reference was made to his being engaged for the pre-post favourite for the Wellington Cup, having a ride on a horse well favoured in the Karaka Million, and also there was reference made to the Waikato Guineas and Mr Grylls’ mount there on a horse called MONGOLIAN KHAN.

3.6 Mr Tankard pointed to a number of decisions of raceday committees and tribunals, and in particular the decision of the Raceday Committee in the case of RIU v C (August 2014). It was Mr Tankard’s position that the riding on that occasion had been categorised as being at the highest level of carelessness and had resulted in a period of suspension of 16 days. Here it was said by the RIU on the day and repeated today, that the carelessness exhibited by Mr Grylls was in what has been described as mid-range. When questioned by the Tribunal, Mr Tankard contended that the period of suspension should have been significantly less and that 18 days was inconsistent with C. There were other cases referred to, in particular RIU v J (February 2014). That case, which is well known to this Tribunal who sat to hear the appeal, is of little assistance as the facts there were readily distinguishable from the present.

4. THE POSITION OF THE RIU

4.1 Helpful written submissions had been prepared. Mr Oatham, as noted earlier, took issue with Mr Tankard’s categorisation of the inward movement occurring for only two strides and upon Mr Oatham’s reading it was for something like five strides.

4.2 Next Mr Oatham pointed to the consequences of the fall. No fewer than four horses had their chances interfered with. While two came down, two others effectively lost their chances of filling a dividend bearing position.

4.3 Mr Oatham told the Tribunal that the RIU has consistently adopted a starting point of four weeks’ suspension when a fall has occurred. This notwithstanding that the published guidelines do not address that particular circumstance. Mr Oatham, who has served as a steward for many years, said he could not recall a case in a significant or Group race where such serious interference had occurred in the sense that no fewer than four runners had their chances compromised. He explained to the Committee that the C decision while of some assistance involved interference to only one horse.

4.4 With reference to the fine, Mr Oatham pointed out that the rationale for imposing fines, particularly in races of some prestige, is to discourage a win at all costs philosophy which might otherwise apply.

4.5 Mr Oatham then pointed to Rule 920(2) which is referred to in the raceday judicial decision. In particular paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) make reference respectively to the status of the race, the stake payable in respect of the race, and thirdly any consequential effects upon any person or horse as a result of the breach of the rule. Clearly the Committee had that in mind as it is directly referred to.

5. MR GRYLLS’ RECORD

5.1 Returning to Mr Tankard’s submissions. He drew attention to the fact that the Raceday Committee had remarked upon Mr Grylls’ prompt plea of guilty, and he also drew attention to Mr Grylls’ very good record and the fact that this had been noted by the Committee. It was Mr Tankard’s position that neither of these considerations was directly referred to by the Committee in establishing the period of suspension. While it is correct that both of these considerations, the prompt guilty plea and the good record, are noted, it is regrettable that the Raceday Judicial Committee did not make plain what account was taken of those two considerations in fixing the duration of the penalty. If a licensed jockey has a good record and has promptly pleaded guilty, either or both circumstance, if taken into account, should be the subject of some direct reference when fixing the duration of the suspension and/or the fine as the case may be.

6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

6.1 In the Tribunal’s view, Mr Grylls made a serious error of judgement in moving his horse to something like two horse widths towards the rail, the more so when there was clear space to his outside. In our view this took place over more than two strides. The Raceday Judicial Committee described the consequences as catastrophic. Two horses came down and two jockeys were dislodged and, as noted earlier, no fewer than four horses had their chances interfered with. Mr Tankard for his part said that it was the consequences that were over-emphasised by the Raceday Judicial Committee and that even carelessness at a lower level can result in consequences which do not necessarily reflect the degree of carelessness which the jockey has exhibited.

6.2 For our part we take the view that the consequences that were most significant here are the fact that in a 12 horse field no fewer than four of the horses had their chances extinguished. Further it was a Group 2 race.

6.3 We also consider that the Raceday Judicial Committee was right to take account of Rule 920(2) which emphasises the status of the race, the stake payable, and the consequential effects upon persons and horses as a result of the breach of the rule.

6.4 As to the upcoming rides that Mr Grylls has, it is unfortunate that there is such a busy programme and that he has it seems, or did have, the opportunity to ride in significant races upon horses that are presently said to have a considerable chance of success. In our judgment, the upcoming programme that a jockey may have is not a relevant consideration in determining the penalty which should apply. On one view, if a jockey has a significant and important upcoming programme that might be all the more reason why he or she should take particular care to ensure that there is no breach of the rules.

6.5 This penalty handed down by the Raceday Judicial Committee was a stern penalty but not in our view wrong. It is not for us to make minor adjustments or refinements to penalties imposed by Raceday Judicial Committees. It may be that in RIU v C (supra) the jockey was treated leniently. Certainly the race in question there did not bring Rule 920(2) into consideration in a manner comparable to the position here. We take the view that the Raceday Judicial Committee was justified in setting the period of suspension and in fixing the fine, and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

7. COSTS

7.1 The Tribunal heard brief submissions as to costs. It is not the practice of the Appeal Tribunal to award costs on an indemnity basis. In other words persons who bring appeals are not required to meet all of the costs that have been incurred by the RIU and the JCA unless the Appeals Tribunal takes the view that the appeal was quite without merit.

7.2 Mr Tankard is right that this appeal was not meritless. It was and remains a lengthy suspension and Mr Grylls was entitled to bring this appeal and have his advocate advance the submissions that were made on his behalf. We are mindful of the fact that there is a significant suspension in place, there is a fine in place, and this is a longer period of suspension than is commonly imposed. In those circumstances we will award a costs figure that is significantly less than might otherwise be the case. There will be costs payable to the JCA which will only go part way towards meeting their total costs for the reasons explained. Those costs will be $250. And to the RIU the figure of $100.

DATED THIS 10th DAY OF JANUARY 2015

__________________________________________

MURRAY MCKECHNIE

Chairman

Signed pursuant to Rule 1007(5)

Appeal Decision: NO LINKED APPEAL DECISION

Decision Date: 13/01/2015

Publish Date: 13/01/2015

JCA Decision Fields (raw)

Dmitry: This section contains all JCA fields migrated from the raw data.

Data from these fields should be mapped appropriately to display amongst the standard fields above; please make note of any values below that are missing in the above standard fields but should be there.

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hearing_title: Appeal C Grylls v RIU - Decision dated 10 January 2015


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Decision:

BEFORE AN APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF THE

JUDICIAL CONTROL AUTHORITY

UNDER THE RACING ACT 2003

IN THE MATTER of the New Zealand Thoroughbred Rules of Racing

BETWEEN CRAIG GRYLLS, Licenced Jockey

APPELLANT

AND THE RACING INTEGRITY UNIT (RIU)

RESPONDENT

Appeals Tribunal: Mr Murray McKechnie, Chairman & Mr Richard Seabrook

Present: Mr Craig Grylls, Licensed Jockey

Mr Ginger Tankard, Advocate for Mr Grylls

Mr John Oatham, Senior Stipendiary Steward

Mr Matthew Williamson, Registrar

DECISION OF APPEALS TRIBUNAL

ELLERSLIE RACECOURSE

DATED THIS 10th DAY OF JANUARY 2015

1. NATURE OF APPEAL

1.1 This is an appeal from a decision of the Raceday Judicial Committee at Ellerslie on New Year’s Day following Race 5, the New Zealand Bloodstock Royal Stakes, a Group 2 race for three-year-old fillies.

1.2 The senior jockey Mr Craig Grylls pleaded guilty to a charge under Rule 638(1)(d) of careless riding. It was said that he allowed his mount, SAAVOYA, to shift out at the 300 metre mark when not clear of the horse DE KENSINGTON OVAL ridden by Mr Riddell, which clipped a heel and fell. The horse EZRA ridden by Ms Satherley, was unable to avoid the fallen runner DE KENSINGTON OVAL and also fell, and this in turn hampered the chances of the horse DARCI’S DREAM ridden by Mr Cameron.

1.3 After hearing submissions from Mr Grylls and Mr Neal on behalf of the RIU, the Raceday Judicial Committee imposed a suspension to commence after racing on the 3rd of January this year and to conclude on the 31st of January this year, being a period of 18 days. In addition the Committee imposed a fine of $1,000.

1.4 Mr Grylls is represented today by Mr Tankard who is a vastly experienced advocate and it is well known to the tribunal that Mr Tankard has extensive experience in race reading.

2. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

2.1 The legal principles in outline are that an appeal hearing of this kind is by way of rehearing. That means that the Appeals Tribunal must reach its own decision upon its view of the evidence. Nonetheless it must have regard to the decision of the Raceday Judicial Committee and the reasoning set out in that decision. The Tribunal has carefully considered the raceday decision and has read the transcript of the hearing. The principal submission for Mr Grylls is that the period of suspension was too long and there was also reference to the consequences of the fine.

2.2 We shall now outline in summary the cases presented for Mr Grylls, and for the RIU which is represented by Mr Oatham.

3. THE CASE FOR MR GRYLLS

3.1 Mr Tankard contended that the essential facts were not in dispute. That is not accepted by Mr Oatham. It was Mr Tankard’s position that the horse SAAVOYA moved inwards for some two strides when not sufficiently clear of DE KENSINGTON OVAL. For his part, Mr Oatham contends that it was something like five strides.

3.2 The Tribunal was struck by the fact that the head-on view in the film demonstrates that there was clear space to Mr Grylls’ left, to his outside, but nonetheless the horse SAAVOYA was angled towards the rail. It is accepted and not essentially disputed that the inward movement was not abrupt but it was significant and involved moving in some two horse widths.

3.3 Mr Tankard pointed to the fact that the penalty guidelines do not provide any assistance in cases where a fall has occurred. Mr Oatham responded to that and we shall make reference to that later in this decision.

3.4 Mr Tankard then pointed to Mr Grylls’ very good riding record. In the last 12 months he has had something like 820 rides without facing a careless riding charge.

3.5 It was then explained to the Tribunal that Mr Grylls had very significant rides available to him in the upcoming period covered by the period of suspension. Reference was made to his being engaged for the pre-post favourite for the Wellington Cup, having a ride on a horse well favoured in the Karaka Million, and also there was reference made to the Waikato Guineas and Mr Grylls’ mount there on a horse called MONGOLIAN KHAN.

3.6 Mr Tankard pointed to a number of decisions of raceday committees and tribunals, and in particular the decision of the Raceday Committee in the case of RIU v C (August 2014). It was Mr Tankard’s position that the riding on that occasion had been categorised as being at the highest level of carelessness and had resulted in a period of suspension of 16 days. Here it was said by the RIU on the day and repeated today, that the carelessness exhibited by Mr Grylls was in what has been described as mid-range. When questioned by the Tribunal, Mr Tankard contended that the period of suspension should have been significantly less and that 18 days was inconsistent with C. There were other cases referred to, in particular RIU v J (February 2014). That case, which is well known to this Tribunal who sat to hear the appeal, is of little assistance as the facts there were readily distinguishable from the present.

4. THE POSITION OF THE RIU

4.1 Helpful written submissions had been prepared. Mr Oatham, as noted earlier, took issue with Mr Tankard’s categorisation of the inward movement occurring for only two strides and upon Mr Oatham’s reading it was for something like five strides.

4.2 Next Mr Oatham pointed to the consequences of the fall. No fewer than four horses had their chances interfered with. While two came down, two others effectively lost their chances of filling a dividend bearing position.

4.3 Mr Oatham told the Tribunal that the RIU has consistently adopted a starting point of four weeks’ suspension when a fall has occurred. This notwithstanding that the published guidelines do not address that particular circumstance. Mr Oatham, who has served as a steward for many years, said he could not recall a case in a significant or Group race where such serious interference had occurred in the sense that no fewer than four runners had their chances compromised. He explained to the Committee that the C decision while of some assistance involved interference to only one horse.

4.4 With reference to the fine, Mr Oatham pointed out that the rationale for imposing fines, particularly in races of some prestige, is to discourage a win at all costs philosophy which might otherwise apply.

4.5 Mr Oatham then pointed to Rule 920(2) which is referred to in the raceday judicial decision. In particular paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) make reference respectively to the status of the race, the stake payable in respect of the race, and thirdly any consequential effects upon any person or horse as a result of the breach of the rule. Clearly the Committee had that in mind as it is directly referred to.

5. MR GRYLLS’ RECORD

5.1 Returning to Mr Tankard’s submissions. He drew attention to the fact that the Raceday Committee had remarked upon Mr Grylls’ prompt plea of guilty, and he also drew attention to Mr Grylls’ very good record and the fact that this had been noted by the Committee. It was Mr Tankard’s position that neither of these considerations was directly referred to by the Committee in establishing the period of suspension. While it is correct that both of these considerations, the prompt guilty plea and the good record, are noted, it is regrettable that the Raceday Judicial Committee did not make plain what account was taken of those two considerations in fixing the duration of the penalty. If a licensed jockey has a good record and has promptly pleaded guilty, either or both circumstance, if taken into account, should be the subject of some direct reference when fixing the duration of the suspension and/or the fine as the case may be.

6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

6.1 In the Tribunal’s view, Mr Grylls made a serious error of judgement in moving his horse to something like two horse widths towards the rail, the more so when there was clear space to his outside. In our view this took place over more than two strides. The Raceday Judicial Committee described the consequences as catastrophic. Two horses came down and two jockeys were dislodged and, as noted earlier, no fewer than four horses had their chances interfered with. Mr Tankard for his part said that it was the consequences that were over-emphasised by the Raceday Judicial Committee and that even carelessness at a lower level can result in consequences which do not necessarily reflect the degree of carelessness which the jockey has exhibited.

6.2 For our part we take the view that the consequences that were most significant here are the fact that in a 12 horse field no fewer than four of the horses had their chances extinguished. Further it was a Group 2 race.

6.3 We also consider that the Raceday Judicial Committee was right to take account of Rule 920(2) which emphasises the status of the race, the stake payable, and the consequential effects upon persons and horses as a result of the breach of the rule.

6.4 As to the upcoming rides that Mr Grylls has, it is unfortunate that there is such a busy programme and that he has it seems, or did have, the opportunity to ride in significant races upon horses that are presently said to have a considerable chance of success. In our judgment, the upcoming programme that a jockey may have is not a relevant consideration in determining the penalty which should apply. On one view, if a jockey has a significant and important upcoming programme that might be all the more reason why he or she should take particular care to ensure that there is no breach of the rules.

6.5 This penalty handed down by the Raceday Judicial Committee was a stern penalty but not in our view wrong. It is not for us to make minor adjustments or refinements to penalties imposed by Raceday Judicial Committees. It may be that in RIU v C (supra) the jockey was treated leniently. Certainly the race in question there did not bring Rule 920(2) into consideration in a manner comparable to the position here. We take the view that the Raceday Judicial Committee was justified in setting the period of suspension and in fixing the fine, and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

7. COSTS

7.1 The Tribunal heard brief submissions as to costs. It is not the practice of the Appeal Tribunal to award costs on an indemnity basis. In other words persons who bring appeals are not required to meet all of the costs that have been incurred by the RIU and the JCA unless the Appeals Tribunal takes the view that the appeal was quite without merit.

7.2 Mr Tankard is right that this appeal was not meritless. It was and remains a lengthy suspension and Mr Grylls was entitled to bring this appeal and have his advocate advance the submissions that were made on his behalf. We are mindful of the fact that there is a significant suspension in place, there is a fine in place, and this is a longer period of suspension than is commonly imposed. In those circumstances we will award a costs figure that is significantly less than might otherwise be the case. There will be costs payable to the JCA which will only go part way towards meeting their total costs for the reasons explained. Those costs will be $250. And to the RIU the figure of $100.

DATED THIS 10th DAY OF JANUARY 2015

__________________________________________

MURRAY MCKECHNIE

Chairman

Signed pursuant to Rule 1007(5)


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